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WATER AND SANITATION FOR ALL: PARTNERSHIPS AND INNOVATIONS
THE RETURN OF refugees from Tanzania occurred after
the refugees from Goma were repatriated. This gave all
those involved in the repatriation of Kibungo some
advance warning and enough time to plan a response.
During a meeting with UN agencies and non governmen-
tal Organisations, the local Government assigned roles
to the various agencies. Oxfam and 3 other agencies,
were given the duty of supplying water along the route
the refugees were to take.
By this stage the route had been reconnoitred and sites for
water points already proposed. Water bladders were placed
every 5 to 8 km along the road and were generally to be
supplied by tankers.
Occasionally the bladders were connected up to an exist-
ing source of water, in this case agreements were made with
the water committees who managed the source. If the water
was pumped to the source then a one off payment was also
normally agreed to cover the cost of diesel or electricity.
A rapid programme of repairing handpumps on or near
the route was carried out, providing water points every 1km
for a total distance of about 10km. Three pumping and
treatment stations were set up to supply the tankers with
portable water. Two of these stations were positioned on
the route fairly close to the border. These, along with the
handpumps, proved to be extremely effective as they pro-
vided a permanent water supply to the returnees during the
most chaotic times when the route was so congested by
walkers that the water tankers were not able to pass. The
further away from the border, the more the people dis-
persed from the main route and the easier access became,
allowing deliveries of water to the bladders.
Water bladders and food stocks were placed at Open
Relief Centres at the Administrative Buildings in each Com-
mune. The Government planned that the refugees would
return to their home communes to be registered and to
receive food before going to their homes. It was expected
people would stay two or three days here, accustoming
themselves to their return and finding out about their old
communities and their houses.
The numbers crossing the border reached 40,000 a day.
Trucking started soon after the refugees started coming
across in large numbers. Put down and pick up points were
positioned just before and after major junctions; people
were dropped off before the junction and had to walk
across it in the direction they wanted to go where they were
picked up again and continued their journey by truck.
These points became major centres for water and sanitation
needs, rapidly filling and emptying as fleets of trucks came
and went. The way the Tanzanian camps were organised
and then emptied meant that waves of refugees tended to
come from the same area so that one day typically saw
the majority of refugees being trucked North and then
two days later most would be tucked West. This meant
that water points needed to be set up one day and then
moved to a new site the next; a situation that heavily
favoured bladders for their ease of installation.
Each Commune provided sanitation teams, paid for by
the Oxfam and others, to clean up each day after the
refugees. Each team was provided with wheelbarrows,
shovels and lime for disinfection and every team member
with boots, gloves and a face mask.
This whole operation proved to be extremely successful
the large majority of deaths seven, was caused by cars
running people over as they walked along the road (UN
High Commission for Human Rights figures). This in itself
was kept low as the Authorities had prevented all but
essential vehicles from getting close to the border during the
height of the repatriation, a measure disputed by journalists
and many aid agencies but proving extremely effective in
reducing the number of accidents.
This emergency response was carried out successfully in
a large part by the agencies who were already working in the
region before the repatriation (transport of refugees was
one main sector where a specialist body, International
Organisation of Migration, IOM, came in to carry out a
specific rile). The impending influx attracted media atten-
tion followed closely by other NGOs wanting part of the
action. They carried with them a sense of urgency and a
general feeling of We don’t want another Goma on our
hands’, referring to the huge loss of life due to lack or
preparedness for such a large and rapid exodus in 1994.
The Local Authorities kept to a minimum the number of
people able to travel and therefore work along the route of
the returnees, disappointing many NGOs but greatly reduc-
ing the number of deaths caused by vehicles hitting returnees
on foot. Many NGOs left after the emergency having
accomplished little but also with little wish to stay and take
part in the resettlement of the refugees, there were also
NGOs that came and went and provided a substantial
contribution to the successful repatriation. These NGOs
then changed the nature of the emergency, increasing the
sense of urgency whose carryover could be felt after they
left. In hindsight, most work could have been done without
them. There are two reasons for this; the first should have
been foreseen in that the refugees were returning in rela-
tively good health and could survive the journey without
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much support, the second was more fortuitous and
unforeseen in that there was a delay of at least two weeks
between the  incidence of reliable indicators that the
refugees would return en masse and their actual return,
allowing an adequate time for planning and mobilisa-
tion. On balance the increase in the number of NGOs
during the emergency was a necessary precaution but
their presence changed and intensified the response to the
emergency.
Decisions made in the emergency period affected deci-
sions made in the medium term. An example of this was the
decision to truck water to water points for the returnees.
Three pumping and treatment stations were constructed
and provided water to the population on the move. They
continued to be used to provide water to the open relief
centres, used to congregate and register the returnees at the
treatment stations with trucks asking for water for con-
struction purposes. By modifying the stations to allow them
to pump untreated water for construction purposes as well
as to pump treated water (with different pumps) the stations
have been given a further 6 to 9 months operating life
instead of the originally proposed 3 to 4 weeks. This
deterred many agencies searching for closer, but not as easy
to exploit, water sources and possibly encouraged con-
struction on sites not suitable for habitation due to a lack of
water.
The medium term
As everyone reached their homes the scale of the problem
became apparent, the number of people whose houses had
been destroyed or occupied or who just did not have a
house were much greater than the woefully inadequate
planning had accounted for. The Authorities had come up
with a preliminary list of new resettlement sites for approxi-
mately 7,000 families. As the list had been compiled from
lists made at each Commune, the quality of planning varied
immensely. Many of these sites, at the time, were no more
than a name, often not even on the map. In the mad
scramble for donor money, agencies were committing them-
selves to build shelters on sites they had not seen.
Oxfam resolved to carry out an assessment of the sites to
ensure that people could live sustainably. It was considered
that there were four main sectors that would enable people
to continue to live on these sites. These were:
• shelter - The site should provide adequate local materi-
als to construct enough houses for the numbers to be
settled there,
• livelihood - The site must allow the residents to practice
a livelihood; in most cases this meant that the site would
have to neighbour an adequate area of land that could
be cultivated, other settlement sites were on main roads
on the outskirts, of towns, specifically sited for traders.
• water supply - There must be an existing potable water
supply close to the site that could cope with the increased
demand or a viable and economic alternative source
that must be able to be exploited.
• sanitation - The site must be suitable for the construc-
tion of adequate sanitation facilities. In addition to
the soil being appropriate for pit latrines, the site
slope must be adequate for drainage and nearby
marshy areas should be avoided to reduce the inci-
dence of malaria.
Of these four criteria, shelter was considered only in the
availability of decent soil for constructing mud bricks, the
ease of access to the site for bringing construction materials
and the availability of water for construction purposes. It
was reasoned that many other agencies would be involved
in this sector and the technical difficulties posed would be
small. Latrine construction was also a secondary criteria as
most sanitation work would be carried out by the shelter
construction agency. The assessment examined drainage
and possible vector control problems when they were rel-
evant to the site.
The assessment looked more specifically at the availabil-
ity of potable water and the possibilities for land use. By
concentrating on these two sectors Oxfam thought it could
provide valuable information on the sustainability of the
sites; if there was adequate water and people could create
and continue a livelihood then it would be likely that they
would remain on the sites. These two sectors had not been
addressed in the original listing of sites and were also specific
areas of expertise for Oxfam. It was considered then that
this assessment would produce the most effective use of
Oxfam’s small  but competent team of specialists. The
information collected would be used to guide the Local
Authorities and other humanitarian agencies in the
sustainability and sizing of sites. It would also help deter-
mine the direction of Oxfam’s programme in Kibungo in
the longer term. As the assessment progressed it became
clear that original expectations on sites were much too low;
the number proposed and the population in them were
increased. The assessment was carried out as much as
possible in conjunction with the Local Authorities; the
Bourgmestres (Commune Leaders) were contacted and
visited sites with the Assessment Team, whenever feasible
the Prefectorial Representatives of the Water Department in
the Ministry of Public Works and of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture also came along, providing local knowledge of spring
sites and soil characteristics necessary to grow different
crops.
At the same time as the assessment was being carried out,
Oxfam was continuing its work in the existing resettlement
sites, greatly increasing its emphasis on community mobili-
sation as the number of people living in the sites increased
and the community strengthened. The staffing levels changed
dramatically as the emergency phase finished. Oxfam re-
duced its expatriate engineers working in the Prefecture
from four to two (reducing to one for the longer term work)
and increased the number of local engineers from one to
two, community mobilisation staff increased from one to
six. Two of the three water pumping and treatment stations
were modified and kept on in the short to medium term to
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supply tankers providing water to resettlement sites. The
uses the water was mainly put to changed from drinking to
construction and drinking as more agencies started build-
ing shelters. This reduced the amount of water needing
treatment. Again, this was an effective use of Oxfam’s
resources by running pumping and treatment stations and
supplying trucking bladders for trucks hired and run by
other agencies and the Local Authorities Oxfam was able to
ensure an adequate supply of water for construction and
drinking with a minimum management commitment.
Longer term objectives
The assessment concluded that almost all the sites were
habitable, some needed the proposed number of inhabit-
ants to be reduced, nearly every one needed improvements
to the water supply. These improvements took a diverse
number of forms shallow wells and spring protection,
boreholes with handpumps, gravity and pumped systems,
extensions to existing systems and rainwater catchment.
The underlying premise was that wherever possible, espe-
cially for small villages, a low technology and hence more
cost effective and sustainable system would be promoted.
For some sites the only solution would have been a system
that would have required a technology too advanced to be
paid for and maintained by a small rural village. Rwanda
has a long history of failed water supply systems and Oxfam
did not want to continue this tradition. This requirement for
finding sites with the possibility of easily sustainable water
supplies had to be balanced though with the very pressing
need for resettlement sites in a country with very little free
land.
The information collected was spread as far as possible,
allowing other agencies to prioritise their work towards
sites that were likely to be more sustainable. The Local
Authorities were able to use the information to upgrade or
minimise the sites as well as a basis on which they could ask
for aid from the International Community. Oxfam made it
clear that it would carry out projects leading from the
assessment only at the request of the Authorities.
The role Oxfam envisaged for itself was generally of
technical supervision and community mobilisation. Its small
team of engineers and larger team of community mobilisers
were well suited for this. It would also strengthen a small but
rapidly expanding sector of private contractors. An excep-
tion to this was in drilling boreholes where Oxfam had
unrivalled in-country experience and facilities and in sev-
eral areas there was no other alternative to provide potable
water. The rainwater catchment programme also diverges
from this role. Although rainwater catchment is seen by
many as an important tool in the opening up of marginal
lands in Rwanda, there have been a few small scale projects
to construct rainwater tanks. Therefore, Oxfam is to set up
a pilot project with two main functions; the first would be to
test various systems and to train masons in the construction
and repair of the tanks, the second would be to mobilise the
community to use and carry out maintenance of the rainwa-
ter catchment systems. At the completion of the pilot project,
the tank construction programme and the trained masons
would be taken on by agencies carrying out the construc-
tion of shelters. Oxfam’s role would then be one of quality
control, training of further masons and possibly contin-
ued community mobilisation if the shelter agency does
not have a mobilisation programme itself. The manage-
ment of the rainwater catchment construction by others
allows Oxfam to spread its resources and expertise
further.
Mass repatriation - emergency or
development
The overarching paradox of a mass repatriation is that
although the needs are immediate and must be addressed
immediately, the solutions need to be sustainable and there-
fore attained over a long time period.
It is evident that such a large scale and sudden repatriation
requires an emergency response to the immediate needs of
the returnees. These needs are health care and transport for
the vulnerable, water and possibly food for the journey and
temporary shelter until more permanent accommodation
can be arranged (i.e. one or two days in a communal shelter
until people are assured they can return to their intact and
unoccupied houses or can find themselves some other
temporary solution until they can find permanent accom-
modation). This emergency aid is provided during the
journey until people reach their homes.
As people return to their homes or move to resettlement
sites the need to establish a developmental approach as
soon as possible to promote sustainability is obvious. But
there are major constraints that slow the process of moving
away from an emergency strategy. By far the biggest is the
scale of the repatriation and the need to provide the resettlers
the basics of shelter, clean water and the means to make a
livelihood such as cultivable land. Development strategies
generally start small scale and are timely a process that
leaves out the participatory component produces faster
results and has a larger geographical impact but the longer
term results are invariably poor. As the apparent needs in
the repatriation are seen and obvious many implementing
agencies were tempted to bypass the process of allowing
communities to communicate their actual needs both at the
planning and the implementation phases.
The Government, both at a national and a local level
was not as clear as it could have been in its setting of
goals for the repatriation. There were several good
reasons for this, mainly due to the newness of the
Government and its need to establish Governance with
people who had never governed before and with re-
sources that had been totally looted and destroyed by the
previous Government. This meant that there was still a
lot of confusion in the roles of Government Departments
and that many of the people in decision-making positions
were temporary, pending a reorganisation of their De-
partment or Ministry, reducing their effectiveness. Loot-
ing by the previous Government resulted in the position
of the majority of International NGOs being better
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equipped that the Government at both national and local
levels. Ministry roles overlapped and although the repa-
triation was directed by the Ministry of Rehabilitation
and Social Reintegration (MINIREISO) there were occa-
sional differences of opinion between other Ministries
and MINIREISO, especially on technical issues.
Although it was known that the refugees would return
to Rwanda at some time and the Government voiced its
approval of this, there was little concrete planning for their
return at a local level. Lists of resettlement sites, were drawn
up no more than three weeks before the refugees started
returning en masse. NGOs, from combined experience
from similar events, should have pushed more for the
preplanning of sites and should have been more imaginative
and sensitive in their aid to the Government. Suggestions
within NGOs that they should bring in experts from other
African countries that had carried out similar land reallocations
were not taken further by the NGOs themselves.
In most of the resettlement sites there were no commu-
nities at the start of the construction of the shelters,
making community participation invalid. Even as the
sites grew shape there were little signs of occupancy, this
is starting to change as the pressure to resettle people
increases. Even with people living in the shelters or
temporary accommodation of the sites there is often little
sense of community especially if people have been
moved from several places to be settled on the site.
Previous leaders from before the genocide have often
either been discredited or killed although new leaders
came forward quickly enough with the guidance of the
Local Administration to represent the community. Much
information can be gleamed by talking to existing
neighbouring communities about the problems they face
and their methods of solving them.
One other obstruction to a development inclined pro-
gramme was the level of insecurity throughout the country.
As the refugees returned en masse it was suspected that
many of the ex-Government forces and the Interhamwe
(Hutu militia) entered Rwanda with weapons. After their
return there was an increase in security incidents with
several expatriates and local staff from NGOs and the UN
being attacked and killed. This stopped and then alter
severely limited the movements of humanitarian agencies:
some agencies went with military escorts and very few
warned communities or Local Authorities of their visits to
reduce the likelihood of ambush. This then, made links
based on trust, necessary for all the shallowest of commu-
nity involvement, extremely difficult. As many NGO work-
ers commented at the time “It’s difficult for communities to
express their needs to you when you are being protected by
an armed soldier”
Conclusions and recommendations
Oxfam’s staged response proved to be generally success-
ful. The actual repatriation required a fast reaction with
a large technical input. That complete, the assessment
provided valuable information to many organisations
and provided a means to evaluate the resettlement sites
for their suitability. The modification of the water
treatment stations and the handling over of the manage-
ment of the water trucking were the start of Oxfam’s
reduction in operationality. The various options for
water supply to the resettlement sites and the expansion
of the community participation role in the longer term
were an indication of Oxfam’s realisation of the com-
plexity of the situation and its commitment to sustainable
solutions. By targeting its involvement towards areas
specific to its specialist expertise, such as training ma-
sons for other agencies in rainwater tank construction, its
influence was much greater than would have otherwise
been. Oxfam’s change in its manner of working was
reflected in its staffing levels as the programme became
more development-oriented the number of staff actually
increased but the emphasis moved away from expatriate
emergency technical staff to a much higher proportion of
local, community mobilisation experts.
The lack of timely and adequate planning and position-
ing of the sites proved to be one of the main obstructions to
the smooth running of the response to the repatriation. It
was always known that the refugees would return at some
point. The choosing and assessment of sites could have
happened 6 months or a year before they did, producing a
much greater impact and enabling a much better organised
response. The UN and NGO’s should have pressed the
Government at local and national level to produce definite
plans and they should have pledged more resources to
helping the Government in this.
Agencies that were already working in Kibungo had a
distinct advantage over ones that came in especially to
respond to the repatriation. Although the newly arrived
agencies did provide useful and needed assistance, their
impact on the whole situation changed the response into a
more frantic and emergency-led one.
Staff at all levels should always keep in mind the impact that
their decisions make in the long term. Decisions made in the
emergency phase are often difficult to change at a later date.
Communities should be engaged at the earliest possible
moment. Even when the resettlement site is empty, neigh-
bouring communities can be a useful source of information.
The success of the repatriation depends to a great
extent on the Home Goverment and the Government that
hosted the refugees. Their decisions normally affect the
return of the refugees more than the aid given by the
International Community. The role of the UN and NGOs
can never be more than to try to influence the Govern-
ments’ decisions and to provide aid within the frame-
work set up by the Governments.
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